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1‘Placebos’ and the Logic of Placebo Comparison
Andrew Turner
Abstract
Robin Nunn has argued that we should stop using the terms ‘placebo’ and
‘placebo effect’. I argue in support of Nunn’s position by considering the logic of
why we perform placebo comparisons. Like all comparisons, placebo comparison
is just a case of comparing one thing with another, but it is a mistake, I argue, to
think  of  placebo  comparison  as  a  case  where  something  is  compared  to  ‘a
placebo’. Rather, placebo comparison should be understood as a situation which
sets-up the treatment  and control  groups  in  a  particular  way;  not  as  a case
involving objects or procedures called ‘placebos’ employed in order to control for
‘placebo effects’. 
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2‘Placebos’ and the Logic of Placebo Comparison
Robin Nunn has argued that we should stop using the terms ‘placebo’ and
‘placebo  effect’  (Nunn  2009a,  b).  He  claims  the  terms  are  fraught  with
conceptual confusion, and that there is good empirical evidence that lumping a
disparate  range  of  elements  together  under  these  terms  is,  in  essence,  like
mixing paint colours to get brown (See the two meta-analyses:  Hrobjartsson and
Gøtzsche  (2001, 2004)). The point being that, if we do wish to say something
informative  about  medical  treatments,  ‘placebo’  and  ‘placebo  effect’  are  not
terms which are analytically useful1. Instead, we should always be much more
specific about the particular details of particular therapeutic situations; and when
we are, we stop needing to use the term ‘placebo’ or ‘placebo effect’. 
I agree. In what follows I argue in support of Nunn’s position. Importantly I
think that much of the work needed to support Nunn’s position can be achieved
through considering the logic of why we perform placebo comparisons. Like all
comparisons,  placebo comparison is  just  a case of  comparing one thing with
another, but it is a mistake, I argue, to think of placebo comparison as a case
where something is compared to ‘a placebo’. What we compare are treatment
groups, or better, the average effect sizes in our groups. Placebo comparison
should be understood as a situation which sets-up those groups in a particular
way; not as a case involving objects or procedures called ‘placebos’ employed in
order to control for ‘placebo effects’. 
In essence my argument is an elaboration of a simple idea, which is neatly
summed up by Austin Bradford Hill: 
‘To some patients a specific drug is given, to others it is not. The
progress and prognosis of these patients are then compared. But
in  making  this  comparison  in  relation  to  the  treatment  the
fundamental assumption is made – and must be made – that the
two  groups  are  equivalent  in  all  respects,  except  for  the
difference in treatment’ (Hill 1951: 278)
1 The concern in this paper is with placebo comparison, and so the argument is about the
use of the term ‘placebo’ in a research context. Clearly however, the term has uses in
clinical contexts that may be valid for independent reasons. I would expect the argument
made here to apply to the clinical context; since the general idea is simply that the term
obscures what can be better explained in more precise terms. However I will not argue
explicitly for this here.
3The logic of placebo comparison
Consider  first  some  preliminary  points  about  the  purpose  of  placebo
comparison. I claim that the key epistemic aim of placebo comparison, which is
what is important to this discussion, is to learn about the efficacy of particular
aspects of a treatment. That is not to say that there might not be other aims in
mind  when  placebo  comparisons,  or  placebo  controlled  trials  (PCTs),  are
performed –  such as  having to meet  regulatory  requirements on the road to
getting a new treatment approved, or performing a trial that is more likely to
show a new treatment in a positive light (as opposed, for example, to comparing
with the current best treatment). These other, more instrumental, aims will not
be the focus of my argument however. 
We should note that while I  claim the aim of placebo comparison is to
learn about efficacy, placebo comparison is not, by any means, the only way we
can  learn  about  efficacy.  However  it  is,  prima  facie,  a  good  way.  Indeed  a
principle such as ‘a treatment is efficacious if and only if it outperforms placebo’
looks very tempting2:  it underlies, for example, the often rehearsed argument
that PCTs possess unparalleled ‘assay sensitivity’  (Temple and Ellenberg 2000),
though  whether  placebo  comparisons  really  do  possess  significant  epistemic
virtue, over and above other comparisons, has recently been questioned (Howick
2009). But in the ideal case at least, the logic of placebo comparison is well-
equipped to give us insight into the efficacy of the aspect of the treatment under
investigation.
One  might  also  claim  that  placebo  comparisons  give  us  insights  into
placebo  effects,  at  least  in  so  far  as  we  take  an  interest  in  the  outcomes
observed  in  the  placebo  groups  of  PCTs.  Ernst  and  Resch  (1995)  distinguish
between,  what  they  call,  true  and perceived  placebo effects.  They note that
observations of outcomes in placebo groups confound the ‘true placebo effects’
with  other  effects  that  result  from natural  variations in  the condition.  So the
outcomes of the placebo group in a PCT do not represent placebo effects as
such, but only ‘perceived placebo effects’. In what follows however, the concern
2Although  note  that  such  a  principle  does  not  imply  that  we  cannot  know  that  a
treatment  is  efficacious  unless  a  placebo  comparison  has  been  performed.  It  simply
equates  efficacious  treatments  with placebo outperforming treatments.  If  we know a
treatment is efficacious, that justifies the belief that it would outperform placebo, were
such a comparison to be performed.
4will be with the comparative nature of PCTs, and not with what may or may not
be inferred from the experimental groups individually.
Consider  now  the  logic  of  placebo  comparison.  The  paradigm  case  of
placebo comparison is the PCT of a drug. Such a comparison is done in order to
measure  the  capacity  of  the  drug  contained  in  the  treatment  to  produce
therapeutic  effects.  To  avoid  confusion  and to  make clear  what  is  meant  by
talking  in  terms  of  ‘aspects  of  a  treatment’  we  can  stipulate  a  distinction
between drug and treatment. Take ‘drug’ to denote the (allegedly) therapeutic
chemical  or  chemicals,  and  take  ‘treatment’  to  denote  a  delivery  system,
perhaps but not necessarily containing a drug. Hence for clarity I mean to set-up
the terms such that drugs are not pills, but treatments can be pills (though of
course things besides pills can be treatments), and a pill may or may not contain
a drug while still remaining a treatment, etc. We can also widen this definition of
treatment to include not just the object which is delivering the drug, but also the
way in which it is delivered. So for instance we could talk about the kindness of
the healthcare professional, or the patient’s feeling of hope, as being some of the
contextual aspects of a treatment, just as a drug is a pharmacological aspect of a
treatment. Consequently we can say that the efficacy of the drug is the aspect of
the treatment that we wish to investigate in a PCT of the drug. 
The logic behind placebo comparison is straightforward, especially when
put in terms of trials of drugs. In the ideal case we compare two groups which
are identical  in all  therapeutically relevant respects,  but for the fact that one
group receives the drug whereas the other group does not. This is precisely the
point expressed in the quotation from Austin Bradford Hill, above.
Note that  we must  compare  the presence and absence of  a  drug:  the
comparison between the presence and absence of a treatment is a very different
comparison. The point of comparing two groups that differ only in regards to the
presence  of  a  drug  is  that  it  allows  us  to  infer  that  any  differential  effects
between the groups can be attributed to the drug’s action. This therefore allows
us to reasonably claim that the drug caused those differential effects. Indeed in
the ideal case this method is, as Nancy Cartwright calls it, a ‘clincher’, meaning
that the causal conclusion is deductively implied (Cartwright 2007). 
We can generalise the logic beyond trials of drugs. The efficacy of a drug
is only one aspect of a treatment, and there are many different aspects of a
treatment  that  we might  wish  to  investigate  the  efficacy  of,  beside  its  drug
content. The logic of placebo comparison is indifferent to whether the particular
5aspect to be singled out happens to be a treatment’s drug content. For example,
consider the following case: We investigate whether a treatment consisting of a
pill containing x mg of drug performs better than a treatment consisting of two
pills, one of which contains x mg of drug and the other of which is a sugar pill3. In
that case, it would be the efficacy of ‘receiving an extra sugar pill’ that would be
the aspect of the treatment we were investigating; because that is the aspect of
the treatment that has been singled out.
The logic  of  placebo comparison simply involves singling out particular
aspects of treatments, to which we may or may not be able to attribute efficacy.
There is no logical requirement to only attribute efficacy to the action of drugs. I
claim  that  this  should  be  uncontroversial:  it  really  is  nothing  more  than  an
elaboration of the Hill quote above. 
Where do ‘placebos’ enter into the logic of placebo comparison?
The  following  is  (part  of)  an  influential,  but  much  criticised  (see  for
example: Gøtzsche 1994, 1995; Grünbaum 1991, 1981; Moerman 2002; Miller
and Kaptchuk 2008), definition of a placebo put forward by Arthur and Elaine
Shapiro (see different versions of it in: Shapiro (1964, 1968); Shapiro and Shapiro
(1997b)):
‘[A placebo] is any therapy prescribed knowingly or unknowingly
by a healer, or used by laymen, for its therapeutic effect on a
symptom  or  disease,  but  which  actually  is  ineffective  or  not
specifically effective for the symptom or disorder being treated.’
(Shapiro and Shapiro 1997a: 12) 
Consider that this definition entails that ‘patting ones head’ might be a
placebo for headaches, if a doctor (knowingly or unknowingly) recommended this
to you as a supposedly effective treatment. The fact that the doctor recommends
it as a treatment for headaches fulfils the first part of the definition. The second
part is fulfilled because, as we know, ‘patting one’s head’ is (at least under usual
circumstances)  actually  ineffective  for  treating  headaches:  more  likely  it  will
make it worse. 
3 Or more precisely, a pill with no therapeutically relevant contents (cf. Golomb 1995; 
Golomb et al. 2010)
6‘Patting one’s head’ however would be entirely useless in a PCT of aspirin,
despite  the  fact  that,  according  to  the  Shapiros’  definition,  it  is  a  placebo
headache treatment. The reason it would be useless is clear from the logic of
placebo  comparison  explained  above.  To  reiterate,  comparing  ‘patting  one’s
head’ with aspirin is not a comparison which singles out only the effect of the
particular aspect of the treatment that is under investigation: namely, the action
of the drug aspirin. So even if  we take the Shapiros’  definition seriously (and
many argue we shouldn’t),  the fact  that  something  might,  according  to  that
definition, be a ‘placebo’ treatment for X, does not guarantee that it would be
useful in a PCT of some other treatment for X.
The reason it is instructive to look at the Shapiros’ definition of a placebo –
even though it is highly criticised – is that it embodies an intuitive idea about
‘placebos’.  Namely,  the idea that  ‘placebos’  are particular  things,  or in  other
words, that it makes sense to claim that such-and-such is ‘a placebo’. Such an
idea is  by  no means  unique  to  the  Shapiros’.  The  point  of  the  head-patting
example aims directly at that intuitive idea, and in that sense generalises beyond
the  Shapiro’s  definition.  The  underlying  assumption  of  any  definition  of  ‘a
placebo’ is that ‘placebos’ are conceptually prior to placebo comparisons: as if it
were possible to  take a jar  of  ‘placebos’  off the shelf,  ready to use in some
forthcoming PCT.  I  claim that  this  is  false.  For  any  candidate definition of  ‘a
placebo’  we  can  find  an  object  that  would  fill  the  definition,  but  imagine  a
situation in which we compare it with another treatment and fail to produce a
comparison, which follows the logic set out above, and which I claim is the logic
of placebo comparison. 
Now it  may be argued that  the head-patting example only shows that
there  are  such  things  as  bad  placebo  comparisons;  so  that  the  example  is,
contrary  to  my suggestion,  an example of  a  placebo comparison  (because  it
involves ‘a placebo’), but a bad one (because it doesn’t follow the logic). Instead
I  claim that  we should  not  understand placebo comparison,  good or  bad,  as
involving the comparison of one thing – a placebo – with another – the ‘active’
treatment.  I  will  argue  below  that  whether  one  is  performing  a  placebo
comparison depends only on whether one follows the logic set out above, and in
no  way  depends  on  whether  the  comparison  involves  particular  objects  or
procedures that some may call ‘placebos’.
7What counts as the ‘placebo group’ depends entirely on the intended
comparison
Branthwaite  and  Cooper  (1981) investigated  the  therapeutic  effect  of
branded  packaging.  They  made  a  four  way  comparison  of  branded  and
unbranded,  aspirin  and  sugar  pills4.  They  found  that  branded  packaging
consistently  provided  more  relief  of  headaches:  “Branding  appeared  to
supplement both the inert placebo and the active ingredients to produce more
relief than either placebo or active ingredients alone” (1981: 1578). Their result
however it not the focus here, rather it is the fact that in their paper Branthwaite
and Cooper call the branded and unbranded sugar pills ‘placebos’ and the groups
which received these sugar pills the ‘placebo groups’.  
This is an intuitive way to label the groups if we think that ‘placebos’ are
things,  since  such labelling follows straightforwardly  from the ‘sugar  pill  = a
placebo’ idea. Sugar pills are placebos, groups given sugar pills are, therefore,
placebo groups.
 I claim that Branthwaite and Cooper have labelled their groups incorrectly.
More precisely I claim that which of their groups we choose to call the placebo
group is,  without further specification,  undetermined. The reason is that,  as I
suggested above, the placebo group identifies a group playing a particular logical
role in a comparison; namely, keeping all but one of the therapeutically relevant
aspects of the treatment identical. From Branthwaite and Cooper’s four groups
we can make a number of  different comparisons,  and it  is  only with specific
reference to some particular comparison that it makes sense to invoke the term
placebo group. 
So: If we’re interested the differential effects due to branding between the
two groups receiving aspirin containing pills, then the placebo group in that case
would  be  the  group  receiving  the  non-branded  aspirin  pills.  And  if  we’re
interested  the  differential  effects  due  to  branding  between  the  two  groups
receiving sugar pills, then the placebo group would be the group receiving the
non-branded sugar pill.  If we were interested in the differential effects due to
aspirin in the two branded groups, the placebo group in that case would be group
4Actually  I’m just  assuming they were  sugar pills.  We are  told  in  the  Branthwaite  &
Cooper’s methods section ([1981] p.1576) that the pills not containing aspirin were the
same size, shape, weight and colour, and that they were not designed to taste the same
as aspirin tablets. The content of these pills is not disclosed. 
8receiving  the  branded  sugar  pill.  And  lastly,  if  we  were  interested  in  the
differential effects due to aspirin in the two unbranded groups, the placebo group
would be group receiving the unbranded sugar pill. 
Equally it would make no sense, for example, to call the group receiving
the unbranded sugar pill a placebo group when compared to the branded aspirin
group,  because in that case more than one aspect  of  the treatment is being
singled out, and to reiterate, the logic behind placebo comparison is to single out
only  one  particular  aspect  of  a  treatment.  My  criticism  of  Branthwaite  and
Cooper’s labelling of their groups is simply that we can pick a number of different
pairs (four pairs, in fact) of their four groups which are identical in all but one
respect  (as enumerated above).  So any particular  group may or  may not be
labelled a ‘placebo group’ depending on which pair of groups we have in mind, or
in other words, depending on what comparison is being made. The general point
that  this  enumeration  labours  is  that  we shouldn’t  call  one  group a  placebo
group, independently of a particular comparison. 
This  is  certainly  not  a  re-labelling  a  medical  researcher  would  likely
endorse, and there is a clear objection to consider here. It is an objection to my
claim that as long as the two groups being compared are identical in all but one
respect, then we have a placebo comparison - Isn’t it just wrong to claim this?
Won’t any sensible medical researcher object that a comparison, say, of branded
versus unbranded aspirin is no more a ‘placebo comparison’ than a comparison
between  5mg  and  10mg  of  a  drug:  these  are  more  properly  called  ‘active’
comparisons. 
Such an objection would seem to rest on the known ‘activity’ of aspirin,
namely the fact that aspirin pills contain a chemical (2-acetoxybenzoic acid) with
a  well  understood  analgesic  effect,  whereas  placebos  are  not  thought  of  as
containing  pharmacologically  relevant  chemicals.  So,  if  two  groups  were  to
receive aspirin-containing pills, and those groups differ only in respect of whether
or  not  the  pills  were  branded,  then  neither  group  has  received  a  placebo.
Therefore, it is not a placebo comparison; despite what I might choose call the
underlying logic of that comparison. The objection relies on the idea that we can
distinguish  placebo  from  non-placebo  aspects  of  a  treatment  by  their
mechanism.  The  active  aspects,  like  aspirin-content,  work  through  a  known
chemical  and biological  mechanism, and,  so the argument goes,  the placebo
aspects work through placebo mechanisms that are relevantly different enough
to justify making a distinction between active and placebo comparisons.  More
9needs to be said about ‘placebo mechanisms’ for the objection to be convincing,
and indeed research into – so called – ‘placebo effects’ may seem to provide
some apparent support. 
Price et al  (2008) note in their review of the placebo-research literature
that  recent  work  has  conceptualised  ‘placebo  effects’  in  terms  of  ‘the
psychosocial context surrounding the patient and the effect that this context has
on the patient’s experience, brain, and body’ (2008: 567). Others have captured
this  idea  by  recognising  that  what  is  important  is  the  ability  of  objects  or
procedures to generate therapeutic responses in virtue of the meaning or the
symbolism that  they  have  for  the  patient.  Indeed such  meaning-theories are
prominent  in  the  placebo  literature  (Moerman  et  al.  1979;  Moerman  2002;
Moerman  and  Jonas  2002;  Thompson  et  al.  2009).  Consequently  the  most
interesting,  and  perhaps  most  coherent,  approach  to  understanding  placebo
effects suggests that they should be conceived of as the result of a range of
context-specific  psychological  and  social  factors,  operating  through  specific
physiological  mechanisms  (Hahn  and  Kleinman  1983;  Papakostas  and  Daras
2001; Kaptchuk 2002; Kirmayer 2004; Moerman 2002; Moerman and Jonas 2002;
Price 1984; Stein 1983). 
The point therefore is that placebo mechanisms have in common the fact
that they involve a response to the meaning of some aspect(s) of a treatment;
which, as the objector to my claims will note, is a fact that provides sufficient
basis to distinguish between responses generated in those ways, and responses
generated by, for example, pharmacological  content. Placebo comparisons,  as
anyone pressing the objection would reiterate, are those comparisons where the
observed effects in one or both groups are generated in response to the meaning
of the treatment. Sugar pills are called placebos, because the only conceivable
way  they  could  have  a  therapeutic  effect  is  through  these  meaning-based
placebo mechanisms. A comparison between 10mg and 15mg of a drug is just
not  that  kind  of  comparison,  and  at  most,  a  comparison  of  branded  and
unbranded  aspirin-containing  pills  could  be  thought  of  as  involving  a
pharmacologically enhanced placebo.
I claim this view is not tenable. If we characterise placebo comparisons by
the presence of objects or procedures which are  generating their  therapeutic
effects in virtue of the meaning attached to them, then (as illustrated in the head
patting  example  above)  the  simple  fact  that  one  is  performing  a  placebo
comparison, in that sense, need not entail that one is following the logic set out
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above. Instead our objector now needs to ask of any given placebo comparison
(given it is supposed to be one which measures the efficacy of some aspect of a
treatment)  whether  it  does  follow  the  logic  set  out  above.  Hence  on  the
objector’s view, placebo comparison (that is, comparison with ‘a placebo’) and
efficacy testing need have no connection to each other. Rather, the objector’s
view is  that  ‘placebos’  are  just  another  category  of  objects  and  procedures,
which may be called upon as a control in a clinical trial that may or may not be
investigating the efficacy of some aspect of a treatment. The key question to ask
is what work the distinction between placebo and non-placebo comparisons is
supposed to do here – given that it is not to do with efficacy testing. 
I suggest that this division of comparisons into placebo and non-placebo is
an  arbitrary  division  to  make.  It  is  certainly  not  made  on  the  basis  that
comparison  with  placebos  allows  us  to  attribute  efficacy  to  aspects  of  a
treatment, whereas comparison with ‘active’ treatments does not. Because as
set out above, on the objector’s view, whether a comparison is with ‘a placebo’
or not has nothing to do with whether it is aim is to measure efficacy. 
We could, equally well, stipulate to divide comparisons into those involving
treatments with an aspect that works through the renin-angiotensin system (e.g.
the ACE inhibitors  -  ramipril  etc).  That distinction too has nothing to do with
efficacy testing, and it too divides comparisons according to the mechanism by
which therapeutic responses are generated. The point is that it serves no useful
analytical purpose to divide our clinical trials into those featuring controls that
work through the renin-angiotensin system and those that do not, based on the
presence or absence of, for example, ACE inhibitors in the trial. Just as, I claim, it
serves no useful analytical purpose to call a highly heterogeneous set of objects
and procedures ‘placebos’ and to divided our clinical trials into placebo and non-
placebo controlled, based on the presence or absence of such objects in the trial.
And given the diversity of biopsychosocial factors and mechanisms that ‘placebo
effects’ are suppose to encompass, a division based on the variety of placebo
mechanisms  is  a  great  deal  less  clear  than  a  division  based  on  the  renin-
angiotensin system. 
Contrary to this confusing characterisation of ‘placebos’ I suggest that, if
we think carefully about the logic of placebo comparison, then we don’t need to
talk about ‘placebos’ at all. 
Placebo comparison without ‘placebos’
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Placebo  comparisons  are  those  which  compare  two  groups  that  are
identical in all but one respect. How this identity is ensured, or approximated to,
is a question of trial design. The placebo group in a PCT needs to be designed so
as to ensure the required identity, and as illustrated above, a group which is told
to ‘pat one’s head’ is certainly not a legitimate placebo group for a PCT of the
drug  aspirin.  But,  fairly  obviously,  a  group  given  sugar  pills  exactly  like  the
aspirin-containing pills has much more potential to be a legitimate placebo group
in a PCT of aspirin. The question of what objects or procedures are necessary for
any particular PCT depends on the nature of the treatment as a whole, and the
aspect of that treatment which is being investigated. 
The common equation of ‘placebos’ with sugar pills is the result of the fact
that pills are a paradigmatic example of a drug delivery system. It is almost too
obvious to state that if a treatment is in the form of a single pill containing a
drug, then it makes sense to give patients in the placebo group an exactly similar
non-drug-containing pill in order to avoid confounding the therapeutic action of
the drug with the therapeutic action of simply giving a pill. The fact that this is so
obvious makes it possible to underrate its significance. It tempts us to make the
mistake of  trying to identify placebos  with sugar pills,  rather than taking the
correct view that, across many circumstances, sugar pills are merely highly apt
to ensure identity between the treatment and placebo groups with respect to
‘receiving a pill’. We sometimes give sugar pills to a placebo group to meet the
requirement of keeping treatment groups identical in all but one therapeutically
relevant respect: we do not do it because those pills are ‘placebos’. 
The reiterate: sugar pills are not a special kind of object called ‘placebos’;
it just happens that sugar pills are a particularly easy to grasp example of an
object that might do the work of controlling for certain therapeutically relevant
aspects of a treatment, when we perform a placebo comparison. There is no such
thing as ‘a placebo’, but there are certain ‘control roles’ that need be played in
placebo  comparisons,  just  as  in  any  meaningful  comparison.  If  placebo
comparisons are a special  kind of comparison,  it  is not because they involve
comparison with a special kind of object (‘a placebo’), but because they involve a
control group (the placebo group) with special features. And we know precisely
what those special features are: they are those that ensure the placebo group is
identical to the treatment group in all but one respect.
Now  it  might  be  argued  that  ‘placebo’  is  simply  a  shorthand  way  of
labelling an experimental control such as an ‘exactly similar non-drug-containing
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pill’,  or  perhaps  in  suitably  different  circumstances,  the act  of  ‘patting  one’s
head’. This would be an argument for the view that the notion of ‘a placebo’ does
in fact make sense, when restricted to the context of some particular comparison
and on the understanding that ‘a placebo’ in one context may not remain ‘a
placebo’ in another. Hence, relative to a particular comparison we could quite
legitimately point to some object or procedure and call it ‘a placebo’. Such a view
asserts that the term ‘placebo’ is not meaningless or unhelpful. On the contrary
it purports to do the helpful work of summing up important details about the
control  being  used  in  a  given  comparative  trial;  and  neither  does  it  involve
distinguishing objects and procedures on any mechanistic basis.
This ‘placebo-shorthand’ view does not succeed however. Our two groups
should be identical in all therapeutically relevant respects, except the one under
investigation. And we have said above that a placebo group is a group which
possesses the specific features which ensure this identity. Now ask, what is the
term  ‘placebo’  supposed  to  go  shorthand  for?  –  Presumably,  it  should  go
shorthand for a set of measures we have taken to ensure the identity, between
groups, of some of the therapeutically relevant aspects of the treatment:  but
what set? – If  we mean the measures taken to ensure the identity of  all the
therapeutically relevant aspects,  besides the one being investigated, then we
already have a name for that, that is just the placebo group. Of some purported
placebo group, we need to know whether it genuinely does possess the features
that  would  enable  a  legitimate  placebo  comparison.  That  consists  of  asking
questions  about  particular  aspects  of  the  treatment,  such  as  whether  the
delivery mechanisms are the same, whether the patients are given the same
information, whether the doctors have the same expectations for the two groups
etc,  and  importantly  there  are  no  questions,  at  this  level  of  specificity,  that
involve talking about ‘placebos’.
If however we stipulate that the term ‘placebo’ should go shorthand for
some proper subset of measures, then that fails to be helpful. Since we still need
to ask the same, more specific, questions about each element in the shorthand
account; in order to assess whether the purported ‘placebo’ is legitimate. And
moreover the knowledge that that proper subset of measures genuinely ensures
the required identity between only some therapeutically relevant aspects of the
treatment,  still  does not guarantee the legitimacy of  the placebo group as a
whole: since the legitimacy of the placebo group depends on all aspects (but the
one under investigation) being identical between groups. So for example, if we
13
are conducting a PCT of the drug aspirin, delivered in pill form, we could choose
to call our exactly similar non-drug-containing pills ‘placebo pills’. But we could
still  fail to conduct a legitimate placebo comparison with these ‘placebo pills’;
perhaps because our two groups were, say, given very different information and
reassurance as part of their respective treatments.  And just because we had
called them placebo pills, that would not remove the need to ask specifically,
whether they were similarly coloured, shaped, or possessed no relevantly-active
content – which is what we would have to do anyway, even if we hadn’t called
them placebo pills. The placebo-shorthand view fails because it has no bearing
on those questions we have to ask of any placebo comparison, to ensure it is a
good one. We could certainly stipulate to call certain kinds of control measures
‘placebos’ as a shorthand, but only because we can make any number of such
redundant shorthand stipulations – and even if we were to do this, it would still
be a stipulation that only made sense with respect to the particular comparison
being performed. 
The key point is that it is the specific details of the placebo group, as a
whole, that matter for placebo comparison. The fact that we could stipulate that
a certain subset of features of a particular placebo group should be called ‘a
placebo’  does  not  solve  any  problems.  It  is  redundant  to  call  anything  ‘a
placebo’, even with respect to some particular comparison. 
Meaning-theories of placebo demonstrate which aspects of a treatment
might be therapeutically relevant
I argued above that meaning-theories of placebo do not enable us to make
a useful distinction between ‘placebo’ and ‘active’ comparisons. Never the less
many of the empirical results which inform meaning-theories have taken much of
the  mystery  out  of  –  what  some  would  call  –  ‘placebo  effects’  or  ‘placebo
responses’.  The fact that we can give sophisticated empirical accounts of the
psychological  and  physiological  mechanisms  by  which  expectations,  beliefs,
desires etc have therapeutic effect does not necessitate using the term ‘placebo
effect’, ‘placebo response’, ‘meaning response’ or any of the other candidate re-
phrasings (Nunn 2009a). What these empirical results do highlight however are
the many different aspects of a treatment that can be therapeutically relevant. 
This is significant because, while the logic of placebo comparison tells us
to  keep  therapeutically  relevant  aspects  of  a  treatment  identical  between
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groups, it obviously does not tell us which aspects are therapeutically relevant5.
The  therapeutic  effects  of  many  different  aspects  of  a  treatment  have  been
investigated.  The  surprising  result  –  which  the  meaning-theories  help  us
appreciate – is that the range of aspects which can have a therapeutic effect is
both large and in many cases unintuitive. So for example: the mere number of
pills (Blackwell et al. 1972; de Craen et al. 1999; Moerman 2000), the branding of
pills  (Branthwaite and Cooper 1981), whether one is given a pill or an injection
(Amanzio et al. 2001), and the justified belief that one has undergone surgery
(Cobb et al. 1959; Dimond et al. 1960), are just some examples of the different
aspects of treatments that have been shown to have therapeutic consequences
(See  for  more  references:  Koshi  and  Short  2007;  Price  et  al.  2008;  Stewart-
Williams  and  Podd  2004).  That  is  to  say,  more  pills  are  better  than  fewer,
branded pills are better than unbranded, injections work better than pills, and
the justified belief that one has undergone surgery is itself sufficient for patients
to improve. Other treatment aspects that have been shown to be therapeutically
relevant include contextual factors such as verbal suggestions and the attitude,
enthusiasm and behaviour of the healthcare team  (Adler and Hammett 1973;
Blasi et al. 2001; Kaptchuk 2002; Ong et al. 1995; Price et al. 2008) That is, all
those verbal and non-verbal ways that patients and physicians interact to create
a  caring  treatment  context  –  a  context  which  has  demonstrable  effects  on
patients’ healing. Similarly the cognitive and emotional states of the patient are
also aspects which affect patients’ healing; for example Price et al  (2008) and
Stuart-Williams and Podd (2004) emphasise the role that a patient’s expectations
have been shown to play. 
To perform a good placebo comparison we must ask questions about all
the therapeutically relevant aspects of a treatment. As the experimental results
above show, which aspects turn out to be relevant can be unintuitive. There is a
5Note aside that only some aspects of a treatment can be controlled for by randomisation
(if  that  is,  any  can.  See:  Worrall  2007;  2010).  In  practice  randomisation  and  the
subsequent  adjustment  of  baseline  imbalances  helps  to  minimise,  for  example,  the
influence  of  patients’  differing  expectations.  However  even  in  the  ideal  case
randomisation would not help at all to solve the problem of treatment groups that were
under the supervision of ‘nasty doctor’ on the one hand and ‘nice doctor’ on the other.
The attitude and behaviour of the treating physician is something that we must seek to
homogenise between groups through other means. 
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danger associated with calling certain objects or procedures ‘placebos’, in so far
as this tempts us to forget to check they are genuinely ensuring the required
identity  between  groups  (See  especially,  in  relation  to  pills  and  injections:
Golomb 1995; Golomb et al. 2010). 
If we want to know the efficacy of an extra 5mg of drug, on top of 10mg
we can perform a placebo comparison, which compares two groups identical but
for the fact that one receives 10mg of a drug and the other 15mg.  When we
follow the logic of placebo comparison, we see that it is a matter of how we set
up certain features of the placebo group that matters, not what particular objects
or  procedures  are  employed.  Sometimes  placebo  comparison  may  involve  a
placebo group which receives a  pill  containing 10mg of  a  drug as  a control,
because we are interested in the efficacy of a marginal 5mg above this. At other
times placebo comparison may involve a placebo group which receives a pill
containing only sugar as a control, because we are interested in the efficacy of a
drug  above  the  efficacy  of  pill-receiving.  Both  warrant  being  called  placebo
comparisons. There is no distinction worth making between the two that would
make one a placebo comparison, and the other not.
Conclusion
I claim that the logic of placebo comparison amounts to nothing more than
the idea that efficacy is attributed to some aspect of a treatment on the basis of
differential effects between two groups which are identical in all but that respect.
The properties that some set of objects or procedures will need to possess to
ensure  that  some  comparison  is  a  genuine  placebo  comparison  will  depend
entirely on the details of the aspect of the treatment being investigated. For the
reason that how we achieve identity in all but one respect between groups will
obviously  differ  according  to  the  nature  of  the  treatment  and  the  aspect  of
interest. 
These points are  almost  too obvious to note:  it  is  the logic  of  placebo
comparison that dictates the nature of the controls to be used when we set out
to measure efficacy. The implications of this are less readily acknowledged: there
is no sense besides arbitrary stipulation in calling an object or procedure, which
in certain circumstances can do some of that controlling work, a ‘placebo’. Nor is
there anything to be gained from distinguishing comparisons  on the basis  of
whether they include objects or procedures that generate therapeutic responses
by virtue of the meaning attached to them; that distinction is no more helpful
16
when measuring efficacy (that is, following the logic of – what I call – placebo
comparison) than a distinction between trials that do or do not include objects
that generate therapeutic responses through the renin-angiotensin system. 
At best, the most meaningful thing we might say, while still using the term
‘placebo’, is that one group is the placebo group, while the other is the treatment
group. That doesn’t get us very far however. We know that the properties of the
placebo group are likely to differ depending on the nature of the treatment and
the aspect of that treatment being investigated. We ask questions about those
particular aspects of a treatment individually, such as whether the treatment is
branded  in  both  groups,  what  colour  the  pills  are  in  both  groups,  whether
patient’s were given the same information, or if control-pills contain any other
therapeutically  relevant  chemicals  –  but  that  is  not  to  ask  anything  about
‘placebos’,  that  is  just  to  ask  specific  questions  about  certain  aspects  of  a
treatment. Once we know it is a placebo comparison we don’t need to invoke the
term ‘placebo’ any longer. Rather, the meaningful questions to ask involve being
specific about the details of the controls. ‘Placebo comparison’ only indicates a
comparison with a particular epistemic aim; it indicates what kinds of specific
questions to ask about the controls used. 
I argue for abandoning the terms ‘placebo’ and ‘placebo effects’ because
they serve no analytical purpose. We have a better view of what is going on in a
placebo comparison if our descriptions don’t use those terms. In spite of this a
medical researcher may object that the terms are perfectly functional, even if
they are problematic. The point is that unless the terms are leading to clinically
meaningful  mistakes being made,  then the argument above,  in  an important
sense,  does  not  matter.  In  response  I  would  claim  that  the  terms  may  well
introduce  practical  problems.  Talk  of  ‘placebos’  can  tempt  us  to  neglect
questions  about  the  adequacy  of  the  placebo  group  to  ensure  the  required
identity  to  the treatment group6.  To  give one example:  the credibility  of  trial
results are often diminished where blinding has been unsuccessful (Rabkin et al,
1986). If identical-looking pills given to both groups differ, say, in taste or side-
effects, then we have reason to worry about the success of the trial remaining
blind. I admit that the extent to which this is a clinically meaningful problem is an
empirical question; never the less, being explicit about how the control  group
6 Use of the term ‘placebo’ could also be important in a different way, if that usage 
created therapeutically relevant expectations in a patient. For example in a clinical 
context, through being told one is receiving ‘a placebo’; or in a research context, through
being enrolled in a trial and told that one may be randomised to a placebo group. See for 
example: Kaptchuk et al, (2010) and Enck et al (2011).
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was set-up is a matter of rigour. Talk of ‘placebos’ obscures legitimate questions
about the specific details of the control group.
As explained in the introduction, I think the argument above supports the
position advocated by Robin Nunn, who has argued that we should abandon the
concept of ‘placebos’ and ‘placebo effects’ altogether. Perhaps the support is not
total however, since I am happy to use the term ‘placebo comparison’, whereas
Nunn is not. I use the term to refer to a particular kind of comparison; one with a
specific logic behind it, namely, of making a comparison that singles out only one
aspect of a treatment, and controls the rest. Understood in this way there is no
imperative to use the term placebo comparison rather than some other (say,
efficacy testing,  and the logic  of  efficacy testing).  So the difference between
myself and Nunn is not substantive. The key point is that – what I would like to
call  – placebo comparison involves no commitments to ‘placebos’  or ‘placebo
effects’.
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